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Historical Background 
 
When East Germany joined the West in the early 1990s, the era of the “end of the 
individual”1 was already apparent in the social and industrial fabric. The crisis in 
socialism involved the breakdown of the trade unions, the corporate dispersal of 
manufacture to the economies of the South, the replacement of factories by service 
industries, and the disappearance of the middle class. In worldwide economic terms, 
workers were now measured as standardized units since they no longer “lead an 
independent economic existence.”2
 
 Technology steadily transferred the laborer’s tasks to 
machines. Once the physical movements of a human laborer became appendages of 
electronically controlled installations, the most mundane tasks disappeared without a 
trace. As a result, dire consequences for the social fabric arose, which had been centered 
primarily since Marx on concepts such as human praxis and labor.  
To address society’s diminishment, Jürgen Habermas proposed communicative action 
(open-ended inquiry) to evaluate technologic imperatives, pointing to how individuals 
have evolved into commodities.  Realizing that the end of the work-based society creates 
a “split” society, leaving a productive core of the employed and an ever-expanding 
margin of the jobless that are forced into subcultures, Habermas asks: does the new ‘non-
class’ of non-workers “feel at ease in their alienation”? 3 
 
Just as factories and the 
traditional labor force became obsolete, the ‘individual’ likewise has disappeared. 
Habermas addresses what he calls the “extinction of remembrance,” noting that there is 
“a lack of images of happiness” in the industrial world. “Industrial labor is haunted by the 
telos of its own abolition.” 4 But there is more at stake than pining for a social safety net 
that never really existed. Taking the German word for east, Ost, and nostalgia, the term 
Ostalgie refers to the sense of promise and possibility contained in the GDR hope for the 
socialist project. Ostalgie’s sentiments of loss and longing in the context of broken 
promises and disillusionments does not reflect a longing to return to the GDR, but rather 
expresses a sense of lost possibilities.5
 
  
In 1984 Habermas suggested publically in “The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies” that a misguided memory of a past golden age extolled 
the liberating potential of labor and production. This utopian vision shifted in the 90s 
from its emphasis on the future to an emphasis on the past. When the two Germanys 
united, the East got lost in the desire for an imagined other world.6 The term “unification” 
suggests a return to a prior, more natural state. It is also symptomatic of the lack of 
reflection of what separated the two parts of the country after more than forty years of 
separate development.7
 
   
Seeing the past as a golden era exemplifies Maurice Halbwachs’ observation that a 
society’s current perceived needs impel it to refashion the past, and that successive 
epochs are kept alive through a common symbolic canon even amidst contemporary 
revisions.8 After many disappointments, the East felt devalued, and as a result, related to 
the present in terms of the past. Feelings of guilt and anxiety about the nature of 
capitalism, human rights, and accountability surfaced. Ostalgie aims to salvage the idea 
of a collective fraternity in the factory, i.e., when workers shared exchanges during 
downtime while waiting for a machine to be repaired, or when mothers dropped off their 
children at the communal day-care center or kindergarten and entered the factory gates as 
a unit. Ostalgie takes people back to the moments of solidarity and intra-factory 
arbitration rather than to the drudgery of rote assembly on the factory floor.9
 
  
Illusory Memory 
 
There is a grudging need to refashion the past. Daily life in the GDR had an austere 
rhythm. People pressed their own juices, tolerated substandard laundry detergent, and 
wore unfashionable and inferior denim, among other examples. An enforced economy of 
scarcity placed a premium on thrift. However, a stultifying lack of product innovation in 
industry flowed from a fear of diversity. The motto “There is no obsolescence in our 
culture”10
 
 blocked risk-taking and creative incentives from the private sector. The tiny, 2-
cylinder Trabant auto cost East Germans a year’s salary and yet was constantly in need of 
repair. Since social life in the East revolved around labor, a loss of identity ensued with 
unemployment. The feeling was not so much love of a repressive regime, but anger 
toward a government that failed to deliver. Access to Western consumer goods and 
choice was never seen as a right, yet when consumer choice became available, people felt 
disloyal if they chose labels other than their own.  
The socialist project had an enduring impact on social attitudes. It boasted a shared 
knowledge that created solidarity by excluding others. East Germans felt they had ‘better’ 
products – lenses, machine parts, fountain pens, and educational methods. The slogan, 
“My hand for my product,”11 stood for workers’ pride in their labor. People prized the 
social cohesiveness of the factory brigades, the factory sponsored trips, subsidized 
housing, on-site day-care, and women’s reproductive services. “Germany for Germans” 
was another slogan that encouraged German superiority and exceptionalism. When Stasi 
revelations revealed how deeply the East was kept as “Other,” East Germans still insisted 
on their GDR “identity.” The clash of utopian socialist work values with those of 
capitalist technology became evident in the reduced labor involved in making a product 
today—labor consisting of just a few people to activate the robotic assemblies.  
 
The late 70s saw automated machining methods move into factories at a fraction of the 
labor costs in the West.  As a result, long-term unemployment led to the current 
development of an underclass of part-time employed workers, with severe consequences 
for productivity, public finances, pensions, education, and social stability. A premium on 
productivity pushed companies to invest in technology to boost production with fewer 
workers – a trend that spread from manufacturing into the service sector.  
 
Habermas cautioned that Germany must not forget what ‘progress’ truly meant, nor allow 
it to melt away into oblivion. One of the paradoxes of institutionalized nostalgia is that 
the stronger the loss, the more it over-compensates with commemoration.12
 
 Nostalgia 
obstinately refuses to accept change and history; it is an exercise in invented memory, an 
attempt to preserve a world before it disappears, but also to reinvent it. The inhabitants of 
the GDR were deeply marked by the experience of exile and loss. They wanted to return 
to a time when all was well, when everyone got along. Ostalgie is notable for the way it 
links place and time together, reminding us that the feeling is not just homesickness, but 
the need to travel back through time, to shape it to fit our yearnings. After unification, 
people created museums of practically everything – old photos and films of past events 
were glorified, as were documentary films.  
Traumatic Space 
 
The fall of the Wall provoked an artistic examination of the “traumatic space” of the 
home, school, and factory. Some recalled the “semantic occupation” of language in the 
Propaganda-speak and the creeping in of the “silence of the Orwellian citizen.”13 On the 
cusp of unification, Habermas warned of an ominous political shift as people regressed 
socially to restore so-called “traditional values.” Subgroups hostile to gays, religious 
minorities, and immigrants emerged. Many progressive ideals were rejected in a 
fetishization of “security” and the urge to clamp down on terrorists.14 
 
  
Facing traumatic memory is difficult psychologically when the ‘stories’ it tells of the past 
are too difficult to verify, either because the historical sources have been wiped away or 
because in telling a truthful story, one would have to acknowledge one’s involvement in a 
process that proved to be damaging to one’s value system. For example, people argue on 
both sides whether or not the East German novelist, Christa Wolf, had collaborated with 
the authorities. Her novella, “What Remains,” published in 1990, describes in interior 
monologue her life under surveillance by the Stasi and how memory affects reality. The 
2006 German film, “The Lives of Others,” recounts a similar story. 
 
Most importantly, finding true sources of memory requires that we be wary about the 
principal of consensus. While it points to an agreement that is arrived at through 
dialogue, consensus is also a component of one-dimensional thought. Bureaucratic 
systems naturally want to maintain the performance of the status quo.15 True discovery in 
inquiry involves allowing dissent, or dialectical thinking. Ideas that “disturb the order of 
reason” open “new norms for understanding” 16 and lead to transparency. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard argues that systems theory has “no scientific basis” for use in industry because it 
reduces complexity and diverse views. It maintains the status quo and “induce[s] the 
adoption of individual aspirations to [match] its own ends.”17 
 
A one-dimensional view 
will lead a group to collectively remember the same version of events (“our products 
were superior;” “we knew how to follow orders; “factory life was cohesive”).  
Blind Spots in Memory 
 
One-dimensional consensus leads to “blind spots.” How do they work? For example, a 
blind spot is formed when administrative procedures encourage individuals to “want” 
what the narratives encoded in the system needs in order to perform.  In an Orwellian 
world, the bureaucratic system suggests that people not be content with mere negative 
obedience, nor with abject submission. It implies, “You must act of your own free will, 
you must want what you want.”18 
 
When people adhere without question to orders in a 
factory or a school, their needs and feelings are transformed into internalized commands, 
and the prevailing norms win out without an exchange of views. Consensus assures 
everyone that they agree on the same reply and that they all feel the same way about an 
issue. Not only did Germans feel compelled to adopt a story line (‘we were all victims’) 
after the war, but those who gave the socialist experiment a try also felt inferior when it 
failed. The phrase, “there is no obsolescence in our culture,” proved to be a blind spot 
that duped many.  
Vaclav Havel wrote in 1989 that “the line of conflict did not run between people and the 
state, but rather through the middle of each individual, for everyone in his or her own 
way is both a victim and a supporter of the system.”19
 
 When people emerged from the 
initial shock of unification and saw that freedom of opinion would not get them into 
trouble, a rash of documentaries proliferated jammed with confessions, personal stories, 
and narratives that traced portraits of individuals finding a place for themselves. The 
emotional fragility of such reports exposed a kind of “borderline syndrome.” Found 
items, such as women’s factory smocks, children’s school things, and objects from daily 
life took on enormous importance. Simple objects bespoke a social ecology of the 
vanished world of the factory where time was measured in the rumble of machinery.  
Socialism attempted to reduce injustice by resolving problems through collective efforts. 
Eventually, technological development overtook this utopian effort and Herbert Marcuse 
has pointed to the ‘end of utopia’ in this context.20 Historically, the 19th century 
witnessed an excess of available labor; many new technologies were developed; factories 
were set up for the first time; and the mechanization of the labor was first broken into 
divisions. Workers were uprooted from their daily lives and impoverished. Exploitation, 
the brutality of factory and machine, the increase of labour time without even the 
guarantee of basic necessities of life, together with the extremely low life expectancy and 
injuries caused by negligence—all revealed the dark side of misery in the industrial 
world. But by the middle of the 20th century many violent conflicts were held in check, 
and class struggles eased. Today, another menace strikes at the opportunity that socialism 
offered: Work is increasingly scarce. Work itself is becoming redundant, and with this, 
the oppressed worker reappears as the un- or under-employed worker. This forces a 
reconsideration of what a modern standard of living means. Indignation is no longer 
aroused by material need, yet the threat of a total division of society, centered on the 
competitive sharing out of a limited supply of work with privileges for the few (generated 
by a new scarcity) looms ever larger on the horizon.  
 
Why is it important to preserve memory? Just because we have eliminated the most brutal 
processes of modernization, we should not forget what we have gained in social 
participation and free dialogue. We are more acutely aware of these freedoms now that 
they are threatened. The problem now is the tracelessness of human progress, in that 
progress has stagnated. Wages and home ownership have fallen and education is slipping. 
Fewer people die on the job and life expectancy extends, yet one can be severely 
“impoverished” and (ironically) possess the latest in technology: a smart phone.  
 
Shared Work: the New Collectivism  
 
In no other period since the Cold War ended have companies been simultaneously faster 
to increase spending on machines and software, while slower to add people to run them. 
Instead of hiring or investing in new factories, companies are rehabilitating the old ones 
and investing in technologies to boost production. Robotic forklift cars now replace 
forklift drivers. In some instances, only one or two people are needed to supervise an 
entirely automated factory floor. Software has created jobs as a result of businesses using 
computers in the place of people in the service sectors. For example, waiters are being 
replaced by electronic ordering systems. A Presto console is “cheaper than even the very 
cheapest waiter.”21
 
 Automation and productivity at the Stihl tool factory increased by 6%, 
as noted by Peter Mueller, its owner, who remarks that 120 robots operate around the 
clock on each shift in one of his plants.  
Material improvements for the generations who lived through the economic upswing of 
the post-war period bear the loss of historical memory. Having a car or a washing 
machine once meant unheard upward mobility. But emancipation from the constraints of 
nature must not slip into the amorphousness of an endless pressing forward. Although 
people have the right to vote, entire groups are excluded from advancement because they 
lack technical skills. We need a symbolic form of representation for those things for 
which we have fought, for which a new collective effort is required. Habermas worries, 
“What is terrifying about material progress . . . is this traceless disappearance of the 
historical path. It is terrifying both for past suffering and past sacrifice, which, without 
the possibility of a reconciling rememoration, is as good as lost, and for the identity of 
those who come later, who, without an awareness of the heritage which they have entered 
into, can have no idea of who they are.”22
 
  
Remembering Truthfully 
 
History written without imagination risks a failure of basic human empathy. We often 
think that the historical imagination is seeing PAST—seeing past the squalors of an 
earlier era to the larger truths that it encompassed. Actually, history is about seeing IN, 
capitalism: the worker now sees himself made redundant. For a time in the late 1990s 
Germany was proud to guide workers off the factory floors and into part-time jobs in the 
digital economy. Consequently, workers no longer share shift hours but work in isolation; 
nor do they assemble as a group each day at central worksites. Fewer working hours, 
fewer benefits and outright joblessness define the newest social crisis. Technology 
replaces a worker with its own ‘brain’ and its own dialectical forces. Today’s era of the 
end of the individual now sees the machine as the new Subject.   
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